Hide Footnote Ils ont notamment soutenu le G5 Sahel. Entretien de Crisis Group, Addis-Abeba, 27 avril Certaines choses ne changent pas: Entretiens de Crisis Group, diplomates africains, Addis-Abeba, 16 juin Entretien, Addis-Abeba, 12 juin Quelles sont ces questions: From Early Warning to Early Action , 23 juin Les deux parties doivent rechercher des moyens de repousser leurs limites.
It will allow for more regular strategic discussions with a view to taking concrete joint actions. Nigeria is facing a time of uncertainty and peril. The eight-year-old insurgency by the radical Islamist group Boko Haram persists. An older problem, Biafra separatist agitation in the South East, is provoking dangerous domino effects in the north and Niger Delta, while deadly clashes between herders and farmers are escalating across the central belt and spreading southward.
For the European Union EU , which is already largely engaged in the Niger Delta and the North East, this means that it should also watch closely political, social and security developments in other regions in Nigeria, and work with other international actors to push for much needed reforms that will address these challenges. Most observers doubt he can effectively complete his first term, scheduled to end in The agreement itself is in dispute, however, and those who argue it is unconstitutional, non-binding and divisive will encourage Osinbajo to run.
The Stubborn Boko Haram Insurgency
The South East, where complaints of political marginalisation increasingly are stoking Biafra separatism, also is likely to make a stronger claim to the presidency. To renew confidence and further reduce north-south suspicions, as well as ensure stable federal governance, the EU, along with member states most closely engaged with Nigeria, should:. But, seven months on, the insurgency remains very much alive.
Fighters continue to attack civilians and military targets with new ferocity. In April, there were indications that Boko Haram was establishing new forest camps in Borno and Taraba states, and setting up new cells in Kaduna, Kogi and Niger states. There are also indications that the military, which has units deployed in 28 of the 36 states, is overstretched and unable to provide troops with sufficient resources. Some exhausted troops are complaining of not being rotated.
The rainy season could further hamper operations, enabling Boko Haram to regroup and rearm. On 8 June, the government launched a new food intervention plan for internally displaced persons IDPs in Maiduguri, but it remains impossible to reach many of the needy. Insecurity is also constraining aid efforts, as Boko Haram carried out 97 suicide and vehicle borne attacks between March and June according to Nigerian military authorities. If aid efforts are not stepped up, expanded and sustained, Borno state in particular could slide deeper into humanitarian crisis.
Delivering this package requires safe access, but many humanitarian aid agencies complain that convoys are not effectively secured, exposing them to ambushes and abductions. To help improve confidence and guarantee safer space, the EU should:. Deepening separatist agitation in the Igbo-dominated South East, spurred by perceived political and economic marginalisation, is producing dangerous ripple effects.
A successful sit-at-home action called by agitators on 30 May — the 50th anniversary of the declaration of an independent Biafra — provoked sixteen northern youth groups to demand a week later that Igbos leave the north by 1 October. This in turn prompted a call by a coalition of eight Niger Delta militant youth groups for all Northerners leave the delta by the same date. Although northern state governors disavowed the declarations while Acting President Osinbajo consulted with both northern and south-eastern leaders to defuse tensions, the youth groups have not withdrawn their demands.
Should they seek to enforce them, or should mobs take matters into their own hands, there could be violence and large-scale population displacements. Attacks against Igbos or other southerners in the north might lead some delta militants to target oil companies, either to pressure the federal and northern state governments to stop anti-Igbo violence, or to cover criminal activities. The EU, especially its delegation in Abuja, and its member states should encourage the government to continue consultations with regional leaders and other stakeholders.
In particular, it should:. Violent conflict between largely Muslim Fulani herders and ethnically diverse farmers in predominantly Christian areas has taken on tribal, religious and regional dimensions.
Clashes across the central belt and spreading southward, are killing some 2, people a year. The conflict is now so deadly that many Nigerians fear it could become as dangerous as the Boko Haram insurgency. Escalating internally, the conflict could also spread regionally: This in turn could undermine a fragile region already struggling to defeat the Boko Haram insurgents.
In the absence of a strong federal response, states have been devising their own policies, including bans on open grazing that are vehemently opposed by herders and cattle dealers. Because state governments do not control the police and other security agencies, community vigilantes might be mobilised to enforce these bans, which could spark violence, particularly in Benue and Taraba states.
In the short term, the EU should:. More than a month later, the rift shows no sign of abating. Tension among a number of these states — especially the main protagonists, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE — is not new, but with the Middle East polarised, conflicts persisting around the region and the Gulf states themselves projecting their power, their dispute risks making an already bad situation worse. The threat of direct violence in the Gulf itself may be low, but with the U.
Exactly what precipitated the move is unclear. Doha was given no warning. In conversation with Crisis Group, Saudi and Emirati officials cited no specific catalyst but rather spoke about an accumulation of frustration and unkept pledges. Two issues apparently vexed them in particular. As for timing, it hardly appeared a coincidence that the Saudi move occurred on the heels of a successful visit to Riyadh by U. If the ferocity of the Saudi-led campaign against Qatar is unprecedented, its complaints are longstanding.
Tension across their mutual border grew in the late s, when Doha began to use its financial wherewithal to extend its regional political clout. It pursued an iconoclastic and at times seemingly contradictory foreign policy, at the centre of which was mediation of conflicts; strong ties with the U. For Doha, this policy was a mix of what it considered sound political principles, ally cultivation and an assertion of independence.
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For Riyadh and some other Gulf capitals, this amounted to a leadership challenge and, in some cases, a potential threat to their established domestic order. With the Arab uprisings, intra-Gulf competition intensified as Doha on the one hand and Riyadh as well as Abu Dhabi on the other lined up on opposite sides of the regional divide pitting the Muslim Brotherhood against established regimes.
The various capitals tried to shape the emerging order to their advantage. Qatar doubled down on its support for Hamas and the Brotherhood even as it continued to cultivate a partnership with the U. If the immediate causes of the rift are not clear, the potential consequences are.
The human and economic impact on Qatar and its citizens aside, perpetuation of the crisis risks diverting Gulf Cooperation Council GCC countries from other pressing needs — whether domestic or regional. Moreover, with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE having extended their reach into other conflict theatres — including in particular Libya and the Horn of Africa, regions of particular interest to the EU — what happens today in the Gulf is not likely to stay there:.
At this writing, the main protagonists appear unwilling to budge. Saudi Arabia and its allies have presented a list of demands almost impossible for Qatar to accept —which Doha dutifully rejected. The EU and its member states potentially could play a role in de-escalating the situation.
Under normal circumstances, the U. But these are not normal circumstances, and there is discord as well as confusion in the U. President Trump has tweeted his support for Riyadh even as the secretaries of state and of defence counselled restraint and de-escalation. The EU and its member states by contrast have issued relatively consistent and constructive statements.
They should be modest about their capacity to do so, particularly as long as the U. But once the parties begin to tire of their standoff and look for a way out, Europe could mount its own mediation effort. To date, ISIS has used Thailand as a transit point rather than a target; indeed, there is no known case of a Thai citizen joining the group.
Thus far, the separatist insurgency has had little in common with jihadism. Moreover, the insurgency draws support from traditionalist Islamic leaders, upholders of a syncretic, Sufi-inflected Islam who oppose the rigid views propagated by jihadists. It could also internationalise efforts to defeat them. Yet perpetuation of the conflict risks altering its trajectory which, in turn, threatens to change the nature of the insurgency. In principle, this could potentially open opportunities for foreign jihadists, who have proven adept at exploiting other protracted conflicts.
That remains for now a theoretical threat: As noted, neither the insurgency nor the broader Malay Muslim community has shown any inclination toward jihadism. Without progress in peace talks or an inclusive dialogue, insurgents might resort to more dramatic acts of violence however. They already have shown they can stage attacks outside the deep south, as they did in August when they conducted a series of coordinated, small-scale bombings in seven resort areas, wounding European tourists among others.
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Militant groups also might splinter, with rival factions competing to demonstrate their capabilities to potential supporters and the government. In turn, increased violence or attacks against civilians — particularly outside the conflict zone — could fuel an anti-Islamic backlash and stimulate Buddhist nationalism, creating tensions between Muslim and Buddhist communities throughout the country.
A prolonged conflict means more young Malay Muslims will have grown up in a polarised society and experienced traumatic events.
This could split a more pragmatic elder generation from a more militant younger one. The surest way to reduce these risks would be to bring the insurgency to an end — a task at present both daunting and long-term.
Nouveau départ pour les relations entre l’Union africaine et l’Union européenne
The second example concerns the relative sharing in the use of a rare asset, the personal car, which allows to extend the number of regular users towards a circle of occasional users. Both examples contribute to a two-fold movement, on the one hand the pooling of personal vehicles and in the other hand the individualisation of public transport.
In conclusion, the benefits and the limits, in particular environmental limits, of these evolutions, lead to questioning the urban policies necessary for the regulation and organisation of daily mobilities. Font ainsi partie du paysage urbain, selon les villes: La privatisation made in Africa des services urbains , Paris, L'Harmattan, pp. Movilidad diaria y pobreza en las ciudades subsaharianas, Scripta Nova , vol. Series B, Human Geography , vol. Uganda's appropriate transport services, Transport Reviews , vol. La privatisation made in Africa des services urbains, Paris, L'Harmattan, pp.